-/*-
- * BSD LICENSE
- *
- * Copyright(c) 2016-2017 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- * * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its
- * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
- * from this software without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
- * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
- * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
- * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
- * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
- * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
- * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ * Copyright(c) 2016-2020 Intel Corporation
*/
#ifndef _RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_H_
#include <rte_mempool.h>
#include <rte_common.h>
+/**
+ * Crypto IO Vector (in analogy with struct iovec)
+ * Supposed be used to pass input/output data buffers for crypto data-path
+ * functions.
+ */
+struct rte_crypto_vec {
+ /** virtual address of the data buffer */
+ void *base;
+ /** IOVA of the data buffer */
+ rte_iova_t iova;
+ /** length of the data buffer */
+ uint32_t len;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Crypto scatter-gather list descriptor. Consists of a pointer to an array
+ * of Crypto IO vectors with its size.
+ */
+struct rte_crypto_sgl {
+ /** start of an array of vectors */
+ struct rte_crypto_vec *vec;
+ /** size of an array of vectors */
+ uint32_t num;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Synchronous operation descriptor.
+ * Supposed to be used with CPU crypto API call.
+ */
+struct rte_crypto_sym_vec {
+ /** array of SGL vectors */
+ struct rte_crypto_sgl *sgl;
+ /** array of pointers to IV */
+ void **iv;
+ /** array of pointers to AAD */
+ void **aad;
+ /** array of pointers to digest */
+ void **digest;
+ /**
+ * array of statuses for each operation:
+ * - 0 on success
+ * - errno on error
+ */
+ int32_t *status;
+ /** number of operations to perform */
+ uint32_t num;
+};
+
+/**
+ * used for cpu_crypto_process_bulk() to specify head/tail offsets
+ * for auth/cipher processing.
+ */
+union rte_crypto_sym_ofs {
+ uint64_t raw;
+ struct {
+ struct {
+ uint16_t head;
+ uint16_t tail;
+ } auth, cipher;
+ } ofs;
+};
/** Symmetric Cipher Algorithms */
enum rte_crypto_cipher_algorithm {
/**< Cipher algorithm */
struct {
- uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */
- uint16_t length;/**< key length in bytes */
+ const uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */
+ uint16_t length; /**< key length in bytes */
} key;
/**< Cipher key
*
* keymask. As per RFC3711, the keymask should be padded with trailing
* bytes to match the length of the encryption key used.
*
- * For AES-XTS mode of operation, two keys must be provided and
- * key.data must point to the two keys concatenated together (Key1 ||
- * Key2). The cipher key length will contain the total size of both
- * keys.
- *
* Cipher key length is in bytes. For AES it can be 128 bits (16 bytes),
* 192 bits (24 bytes) or 256 bits (32 bytes).
*
- * For the CCM mode of operation, the only supported key length is 128
- * bits (16 bytes).
- *
* For the RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_F8 mode of operation, key.length
* should be set to the combined length of the encryption key and the
* keymask. Since the keymask and the encryption key are the same size,
* For the AES-XTS mode of operation:
* - Two keys must be provided and key.length refers to total length of
* the two keys.
+ * - key.data must point to the two keys concatenated together
+ * (key1 || key2).
* - Each key can be either 128 bits (16 bytes) or 256 bits (32 bytes).
* - Both keys must have the same size.
**/
*
* - For block ciphers in CTR mode, this is the counter.
*
- * - For GCM mode, this is either the IV (if the length
- * is 96 bits) or J0 (for other sizes), where J0 is as
- * defined by NIST SP800-38D. Regardless of the IV
- * length, a full 16 bytes needs to be allocated.
- *
* - For CCM mode, the first byte is reserved, and the
* nonce should be written starting at &iv[1] (to allow
* space for the implementation to write in the flags
* in the first byte). Note that a full 16 bytes should
* be allocated, even though the length field will
- * have a value less than this.
+ * have a value less than this. Note that the PMDs may
+ * modify the memory reserved (the first byte and the
+ * final padding)
*
* - For AES-XTS, this is the 128bit tweak, i, from
* IEEE Std 1619-2007.
* of the counter (which must be the same as the block
* length of the cipher).
*
- * - For GCM mode, this is either 12 (for 96-bit IVs)
- * or 16, in which case data points to J0.
- *
* - For CCM mode, this is the length of the nonce,
* which can be in the range 7 to 13 inclusive.
*/
/**< HMAC using MD5 algorithm */
RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA1,
- /**< 128 bit SHA algorithm. */
+ /**< 160 bit SHA algorithm. */
RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA1_HMAC,
- /**< HMAC using 128 bit SHA algorithm. */
+ /**< HMAC using 160 bit SHA algorithm.
+ * HMAC-SHA-1-96 can be generated by setting
+ * digest_length to 12 bytes in auth/aead xforms.
+ */
RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA224,
/**< 224 bit SHA algorithm. */
RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA224_HMAC,
RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_ZUC_EIA3,
/**< ZUC algorithm in EIA3 mode */
+ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_224,
+ /**< 224 bit SHA3 algorithm. */
+ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_224_HMAC,
+ /**< HMAC using 224 bit SHA3 algorithm. */
+ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_256,
+ /**< 256 bit SHA3 algorithm. */
+ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_256_HMAC,
+ /**< HMAC using 256 bit SHA3 algorithm. */
+ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_384,
+ /**< 384 bit SHA3 algorithm. */
+ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_384_HMAC,
+ /**< HMAC using 384 bit SHA3 algorithm. */
+ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_512,
+ /**< 512 bit SHA3 algorithm. */
+ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_512_HMAC,
+ /**< HMAC using 512 bit SHA3 algorithm. */
+
RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_LIST_END
};
/**< Authentication algorithm selection */
struct {
- uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */
- uint16_t length;/**< key length in bytes */
+ const uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */
+ uint16_t length; /**< key length in bytes */
} key;
/**< Authentication key data.
* The authentication key length MUST be less than or equal to the
* (for example RFC 2104, FIPS 198a).
*/
- uint16_t digest_length;
- /**< Length of the digest to be returned. If the verify option is set,
- * this specifies the length of the digest to be compared for the
- * session.
- *
- * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that the
- * digest length is compliant with the hash algorithm being used.
- * If the value is less than the maximum length allowed by the hash,
- * the result shall be truncated.
- */
-
struct {
uint16_t offset;
/**< Starting point for Initialisation Vector or Counter,
* specified as number of bytes from start of crypto
* operation (rte_crypto_op).
*
- * - For SNOW 3G in UIA2 mode, for ZUC in EIA3 mode and
- * for AES-GMAC, this is the authentication
- * Initialisation Vector (IV) value.
+ * - For SNOW 3G in UIA2 mode, for ZUC in EIA3 mode
+ * this is the authentication Initialisation Vector
+ * (IV) value. For AES-GMAC IV description please refer
+ * to the field `length` in iv struct.
*
* - For KASUMI in F9 mode and other authentication
* algorithms, this field is not used.
* - For KASUMI in F9 mode and other authentication
* algorithms, this field is not used.
*
+ * - For GMAC mode, this is either:
+ * 1) Number greater or equal to one, which means that IV
+ * is used and J0 will be computed internally, a minimum
+ * of 16 bytes must be allocated.
+ * 2) Zero, in which case data points to J0. In this case
+ * 16 bytes of J0 should be passed where J0 is defined
+ * by NIST SP800-38D.
+ *
*/
} iv; /**< Initialisation vector parameters */
+
+ uint16_t digest_length;
+ /**< Length of the digest to be returned. If the verify option is set,
+ * this specifies the length of the digest to be compared for the
+ * session.
+ *
+ * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that the
+ * digest length is compliant with the hash algorithm being used.
+ * If the value is less than the maximum length allowed by the hash,
+ * the result shall be truncated.
+ */
};
/**< AES algorithm in CCM mode. */
RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM,
/**< AES algorithm in GCM mode. */
+ RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+ /**< Chacha20 cipher with poly1305 authenticator */
RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_LIST_END
};
/**< AEAD algorithm selection */
struct {
- uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */
- uint16_t length;/**< key length in bytes */
+ const uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */
+ uint16_t length; /**< key length in bytes */
} key;
struct {
* specified as number of bytes from start of crypto
* operation (rte_crypto_op).
*
- * - For GCM mode, this is either the IV (if the length
- * is 96 bits) or J0 (for other sizes), where J0 is as
- * defined by NIST SP800-38D. Regardless of the IV
- * length, a full 16 bytes needs to be allocated.
- *
* - For CCM mode, the first byte is reserved, and the
* nonce should be written starting at &iv[1] (to allow
* space for the implementation to write in the flags
* be allocated, even though the length field will
* have a value less than this.
*
+ * - For Chacha20-Poly1305 it is 96-bit nonce.
+ * PMD sets initial counter for Poly1305 key generation
+ * part to 0 and for Chacha20 encryption to 1 as per
+ * rfc8439 2.8. AEAD construction.
+ *
* For optimum performance, the data pointed to SHOULD
* be 8-byte aligned.
*/
uint16_t length;
/**< Length of valid IV data.
*
- * - For GCM mode, this is either 12 (for 96-bit IVs)
- * or 16, in which case data points to J0.
+ * - For GCM mode, this is either:
+ * 1) Number greater or equal to one, which means that IV
+ * is used and J0 will be computed internally, a minimum
+ * of 16 bytes must be allocated.
+ * 2) Zero, in which case data points to J0. In this case
+ * 16 bytes of J0 should be passed where J0 is defined
+ * by NIST SP800-38D.
*
* - For CCM mode, this is the length of the nonce,
* which can be in the range 7 to 13 inclusive.
+ *
+ * - For Chacha20-Poly1305 this field is always 12.
*/
} iv; /**< Initialisation vector parameters */
uint16_t digest_length;
- uint16_t add_auth_data_length;
- /**< The length of the additional authenticated data (AAD) in bytes. */
+ uint16_t aad_length;
+ /**< The length of the additional authenticated data (AAD) in bytes.
+ * For CCM mode, this is the length of the actual AAD, even though
+ * it is required to reserve 18 bytes before the AAD and padding
+ * at the end of it, so a multiple of 16 bytes is allocated.
+ */
};
/** Crypto transformation types */
/**< Handle for the initialised session context */
struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *xform;
/**< Session-less API crypto operation parameters */
+ struct rte_security_session *sec_session;
+ /**< Handle for the initialised security session context */
};
+ RTE_STD_C11
union {
struct {
struct {
* For GCM (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM), for
* "digest result" read "authentication tag T".
*/
- phys_addr_t phys_addr;
+ rte_iova_t phys_addr;
/**< Physical address of digest */
} digest; /**< Digest parameters */
struct {
* Specifically for CCM (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_CCM),
* the caller should setup this field as follows:
*
- * - the nonce should be written starting at an offset
- * of one byte into the array, leaving room for the
- * implementation to write in the flags to the first
- * byte.
- *
- * - the additional authentication data itself should
+ * - the additional authentication data itself should
* be written starting at an offset of 18 bytes into
- * the array, leaving room for the length encoding in
- * the first two bytes of the second block.
+ * the array, leaving room for the first block (16 bytes)
+ * and the length encoding in the first two bytes of the
+ * second block.
*
* - the array should be big enough to hold the above
- * fields, plus any padding to round this up to the
- * nearest multiple of the block size (16 bytes).
- * Padding will be added by the implementation.
+ * fields, plus any padding to round this up to the
+ * nearest multiple of the block size (16 bytes).
+ * Padding will be added by the implementation.
+ *
+ * - Note that PMDs may modify the memory reserved
+ * (first 18 bytes and the final padding).
*
* Finally, for GCM (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM), the
* caller should setup this field as follows:
* of the block size (16 bytes).
*
*/
- phys_addr_t phys_addr; /**< physical address */
+ rte_iova_t phys_addr; /**< physical address */
} aad;
/**< Additional authentication parameters */
} aead;
* For SNOW 3G @ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_SNOW3G_UEA2,
* KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_KASUMI_F8
* and ZUC @ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_ZUC_EEA3,
- * this field should be in bits.
+ * this field should be in bits. For
+ * digest-encrypted cases this must be
+ * an 8-bit multiple.
*/
uint32_t length;
/**< The message length, in bytes, of the
* For SNOW 3G @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SNOW3G_UEA2,
* KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_KASUMI_F8
* and ZUC @ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_ZUC_EEA3,
- * this field should be in bits.
+ * this field should be in bits. For
+ * digest-encrypted cases this must be
+ * an 8-bit multiple.
*/
} data; /**< Data offsets and length for ciphering */
} cipher;
* For SNOW 3G @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SNOW3G_UIA2,
* KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_KASUMI_F9
* and ZUC @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_ZUC_EIA3,
- * this field should be in bits.
+ * this field should be in bits. For
+ * digest-encrypted cases this must be
+ * an 8-bit multiple.
*
* @note
* For KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_KASUMI_F9,
* this offset should be such that
* data to authenticate starts at COUNT.
+ *
+ * @note
+ * For DOCSIS security protocol, this
+ * offset is the DOCSIS header length
+ * and, therefore, also the CRC offset
+ * i.e. the number of bytes into the
+ * packet at which CRC calculation
+ * should begin.
*/
uint32_t length;
/**< The message length, in bytes, of the source
* For SNOW 3G @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SNOW3G_UIA2,
* KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_KASUMI_F9
* and ZUC @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_ZUC_EIA3,
- * this field should be in bits.
+ * this field should be in bits. For
+ * digest-encrypted cases this must be
+ * an 8-bit multiple.
*
* @note
* For KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_KASUMI_F9,
* the length should include the COUNT,
* FRESH, message, direction bit and padding
* (to be multiple of 8 bits).
+ *
+ * @note
+ * For DOCSIS security protocol, this
+ * is the CRC length i.e. the number of
+ * bytes in the packet over which the
+ * CRC should be calculated
*/
} data;
/**< Data offsets and length for authentication */
* For digest generation, the digest result
* will overwrite any data at this location.
*
+ * @note
+ * Digest-encrypted case.
+ * Digest can be generated, appended to
+ * the end of raw data and encrypted
+ * together using chained digest
+ * generation
+ * (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE)
+ * and encryption
+ * (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_ENCRYPT)
+ * xforms. Similarly, authentication
+ * of the raw data against appended,
+ * decrypted digest, can be performed
+ * using decryption
+ * (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_DECRYPT)
+ * and digest verification
+ * (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY)
+ * chained xforms.
+ * To perform those operations, a few
+ * additional conditions must be met:
+ * - caller must allocate at least
+ * digest_length of memory at the end of
+ * source and (in case of out-of-place
+ * operations) destination buffer; those
+ * buffers can be linear or split using
+ * scatter-gather lists,
+ * - digest data pointer must point to
+ * the end of source or (in case of
+ * out-of-place operations) destination
+ * data, which is pointer to the
+ * data buffer + auth.data.offset +
+ * auth.data.length,
+ * - cipher.data.offset +
+ * cipher.data.length must be greater
+ * than auth.data.offset +
+ * auth.data.length and is typically
+ * equal to auth.data.offset +
+ * auth.data.length + digest_length.
+ * - for wireless algorithms, i.e.
+ * SNOW 3G, KASUMI and ZUC, as the
+ * cipher.data.length,
+ * cipher.data.offset,
+ * auth.data.length and
+ * auth.data.offset are in bits, they
+ * must be 8-bit multiples.
+ *
+ * Note, that for security reasons, it
+ * is PMDs' responsibility to not
+ * leave an unencrypted digest in any
+ * buffer after performing auth-cipher
+ * operations.
+ *
*/
- phys_addr_t phys_addr;
+ rte_iova_t phys_addr;
/**< Physical address of digest */
} digest; /**< Digest parameters */
} auth;
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * Converts portion of mbuf data into a vector representation.
+ * Each segment will be represented as a separate entry in *vec* array.
+ * Expects that provided *ofs* + *len* not to exceed mbuf's *pkt_len*.
+ * @param mb
+ * Pointer to the *rte_mbuf* object.
+ * @param ofs
+ * Offset within mbuf data to start with.
+ * @param len
+ * Length of data to represent.
+ * @param vec
+ * Pointer to an output array of IO vectors.
+ * @param num
+ * Size of an output array.
+ * @return
+ * - number of successfully filled entries in *vec* array.
+ * - negative number of elements in *vec* array required.
+ */
+__rte_experimental
+static inline int
+rte_crypto_mbuf_to_vec(const struct rte_mbuf *mb, uint32_t ofs, uint32_t len,
+ struct rte_crypto_vec vec[], uint32_t num)
+{
+ uint32_t i;
+ struct rte_mbuf *nseg;
+ uint32_t left;
+ uint32_t seglen;
+
+ /* assuming that requested data starts in the first segment */
+ RTE_ASSERT(mb->data_len > ofs);
+
+ if (mb->nb_segs > num)
+ return -mb->nb_segs;
+
+ vec[0].base = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(mb, void *, ofs);
+ vec[0].iova = rte_pktmbuf_iova_offset(mb, ofs);
+
+ /* whole data lies in the first segment */
+ seglen = mb->data_len - ofs;
+ if (len <= seglen) {
+ vec[0].len = len;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* data spread across segments */
+ vec[0].len = seglen;
+ left = len - seglen;
+ for (i = 1, nseg = mb->next; nseg != NULL; nseg = nseg->next, i++) {
+
+ vec[i].base = rte_pktmbuf_mtod(nseg, void *);
+ vec[i].iova = rte_pktmbuf_iova(nseg);
+
+ seglen = nseg->data_len;
+ if (left <= seglen) {
+ /* whole requested data is completed */
+ vec[i].len = left;
+ left = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* use whole segment */
+ vec[i].len = seglen;
+ left -= seglen;
+ }
+
+ RTE_ASSERT(left == 0);
+ return i + 1;
+}
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}