X-Git-Url: http://git.droids-corp.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lib%2Flibrte_cryptodev%2Frte_crypto_sym.h;h=bc8da2466786dc1f341864bf61de6f0f319095eb;hb=bf8d075f73c9f9b35bd3395ba1ae1c69ad45373a;hp=a718a7b6ab28afa9f1fa07dd4f7ed98073602982;hpb=b59502a5e3d065ed4c1bb0f9e7888703ee311e33;p=dpdk.git diff --git a/lib/librte_cryptodev/rte_crypto_sym.h b/lib/librte_cryptodev/rte_crypto_sym.h index a718a7b6ab..bc8da24667 100644 --- a/lib/librte_cryptodev/rte_crypto_sym.h +++ b/lib/librte_cryptodev/rte_crypto_sym.h @@ -1,33 +1,5 @@ -/*- - * BSD LICENSE - * - * Copyright(c) 2016-2017 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its - * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived - * from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS - * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT - * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR - * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT - * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT - * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, - * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY - * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT - * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE - * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + * Copyright(c) 2016-2019 Intel Corporation */ #ifndef _RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_H_ @@ -68,27 +40,12 @@ enum rte_crypto_cipher_algorithm { RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_CBC, /**< AES algorithm in CBC mode */ - RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_CCM, - /**< AES algorithm in CCM mode. When this cipher algorithm is used the - * *RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_CCM* element of the - * *rte_crypto_hash_algorithm* enum MUST be used to set up the related - * *rte_crypto_auth_xform* structure in the session context or in - * the op_params of the crypto operation structure in the case of a - * session-less crypto operation - */ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_CTR, /**< AES algorithm in Counter mode */ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_ECB, /**< AES algorithm in ECB mode */ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_F8, /**< AES algorithm in F8 mode */ - RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_GCM, - /**< AES algorithm in GCM mode. When this cipher algorithm is used the - * *RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GCM* element of the *rte_crypto_auth_algorithm* - * enum MUST be used to set up the related *rte_crypto_auth_setup_data* - * structure in the session context or in the op_params of the crypto - * operation structure in the case of a session-less crypto operation. - */ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_XTS, /**< AES algorithm in XTS mode */ @@ -157,8 +114,8 @@ struct rte_crypto_cipher_xform { /**< Cipher algorithm */ struct { - uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */ - size_t length; /**< key length in bytes */ + const uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */ + uint16_t length; /**< key length in bytes */ } key; /**< Cipher key * @@ -167,17 +124,9 @@ struct rte_crypto_cipher_xform { * keymask. As per RFC3711, the keymask should be padded with trailing * bytes to match the length of the encryption key used. * - * For AES-XTS mode of operation, two keys must be provided and - * key.data must point to the two keys concatenated together (Key1 || - * Key2). The cipher key length will contain the total size of both - * keys. - * * Cipher key length is in bytes. For AES it can be 128 bits (16 bytes), * 192 bits (24 bytes) or 256 bits (32 bytes). * - * For the CCM mode of operation, the only supported key length is 128 - * bits (16 bytes). - * * For the RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_F8 mode of operation, key.length * should be set to the combined length of the encryption key and the * keymask. Since the keymask and the encryption key are the same size, @@ -186,6 +135,8 @@ struct rte_crypto_cipher_xform { * For the AES-XTS mode of operation: * - Two keys must be provided and key.length refers to total length of * the two keys. + * - key.data must point to the two keys concatenated together + * (key1 || key2). * - Each key can be either 128 bits (16 bytes) or 256 bits (32 bytes). * - Both keys must have the same size. **/ @@ -201,17 +152,14 @@ struct rte_crypto_cipher_xform { * * - For block ciphers in CTR mode, this is the counter. * - * - For GCM mode, this is either the IV (if the length - * is 96 bits) or J0 (for other sizes), where J0 is as - * defined by NIST SP800-38D. Regardless of the IV - * length, a full 16 bytes needs to be allocated. - * * - For CCM mode, the first byte is reserved, and the * nonce should be written starting at &iv[1] (to allow * space for the implementation to write in the flags * in the first byte). Note that a full 16 bytes should * be allocated, even though the length field will - * have a value less than this. + * have a value less than this. Note that the PMDs may + * modify the memory reserved (the first byte and the + * final padding) * * - For AES-XTS, this is the 128bit tweak, i, from * IEEE Std 1619-2007. @@ -231,9 +179,6 @@ struct rte_crypto_cipher_xform { * of the counter (which must be the same as the block * length of the cipher). * - * - For GCM mode, this is either 12 (for 96-bit IVs) - * or 16, in which case data points to J0. - * * - For CCM mode, this is the length of the nonce, * which can be in the range 7 to 13 inclusive. */ @@ -247,25 +192,8 @@ enum rte_crypto_auth_algorithm { RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_CBC_MAC, /**< AES-CBC-MAC algorithm. Only 128-bit keys are supported. */ - RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_CCM, - /**< AES algorithm in CCM mode. This is an authenticated cipher. When - * this hash algorithm is used, the *RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_CCM* - * element of the *rte_crypto_cipher_algorithm* enum MUST be used to - * set up the related rte_crypto_cipher_setup_data structure in the - * session context or the corresponding parameter in the crypto - * operation data structures op_params parameter MUST be set for a - * session-less crypto operation. - */ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_CMAC, /**< AES CMAC algorithm. */ - RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GCM, - /**< AES algorithm in GCM mode. When this hash algorithm - * is used, the RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_GCM element of the - * rte_crypto_cipher_algorithm enum MUST be used to set up the related - * rte_crypto_cipher_setup_data structure in the session context, or - * the corresponding parameter in the crypto operation data structures - * op_params parameter MUST be set for a session-less crypto operation. - */ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC, /**< AES GMAC algorithm. */ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_XCBC_MAC, @@ -306,6 +234,23 @@ enum rte_crypto_auth_algorithm { RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_ZUC_EIA3, /**< ZUC algorithm in EIA3 mode */ + RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_224, + /**< 224 bit SHA3 algorithm. */ + RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_224_HMAC, + /**< HMAC using 224 bit SHA3 algorithm. */ + RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_256, + /**< 256 bit SHA3 algorithm. */ + RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_256_HMAC, + /**< HMAC using 256 bit SHA3 algorithm. */ + RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_384, + /**< 384 bit SHA3 algorithm. */ + RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_384_HMAC, + /**< HMAC using 384 bit SHA3 algorithm. */ + RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_512, + /**< 512 bit SHA3 algorithm. */ + RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_512_HMAC, + /**< HMAC using 512 bit SHA3 algorithm. */ + RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_LIST_END }; @@ -337,8 +282,8 @@ struct rte_crypto_auth_xform { /**< Authentication algorithm selection */ struct { - uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */ - size_t length; /**< key length in bytes */ + const uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */ + uint16_t length; /**< key length in bytes */ } key; /**< Authentication key data. * The authentication key length MUST be less than or equal to the @@ -347,48 +292,19 @@ struct rte_crypto_auth_xform { * (for example RFC 2104, FIPS 198a). */ - uint16_t digest_length; - /**< Length of the digest to be returned. If the verify option is set, - * this specifies the length of the digest to be compared for the - * session. - * - * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that the - * digest length is compliant with the hash algorithm being used. - * If the value is less than the maximum length allowed by the hash, - * the result shall be truncated. - */ - - uint16_t add_auth_data_length; - /**< The length of the additional authenticated data (AAD) in bytes. - * The maximum permitted value is 65535 (2^16 - 1) bytes, unless - * otherwise specified below. - * - * This field must be specified when the hash algorithm is one of the - * following: - * - * - For GCM (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GCM). In this case, this is - * the length of the Additional Authenticated Data (called A, in NIST - * SP800-38D). - * - * - For CCM (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_CCM). In this case, this is - * the length of the associated data (called A, in NIST SP800-38C). - * Note that this does NOT include the length of any padding, or the - * 18 bytes reserved at the start of the above field to store the - * block B0 and the encoded length. The maximum permitted value in - * this case is 222 bytes. - * - */ - struct { uint16_t offset; /**< Starting point for Initialisation Vector or Counter, * specified as number of bytes from start of crypto * operation (rte_crypto_op). * - * - For KASUMI in F9 mode, SNOW 3G in UIA2 mode, - * for ZUC in EIA3 mode and for AES-GMAC, this is the - * authentication Initialisation Vector (IV) value. + * - For SNOW 3G in UIA2 mode, for ZUC in EIA3 mode + * this is the authentication Initialisation Vector + * (IV) value. For AES-GMAC IV description please refer + * to the field `length` in iv struct. * + * - For KASUMI in F9 mode and other authentication + * algorithms, this field is not used. * * For optimum performance, the data pointed to SHOULD * be 8-byte aligned. @@ -396,12 +312,33 @@ struct rte_crypto_auth_xform { uint16_t length; /**< Length of valid IV data. * - * - For KASUMI in F9 mode, SNOW3G in UIA2 mode, for - * ZUC in EIA3 mode and for AES-GMAC, this is the length - * of the IV. + * - For SNOW3G in UIA2 mode, for ZUC in EIA3 mode and + * for AES-GMAC, this is the length of the IV. + * + * - For KASUMI in F9 mode and other authentication + * algorithms, this field is not used. + * + * - For GMAC mode, this is either: + * 1) Number greater or equal to one, which means that IV + * is used and J0 will be computed internally, a minimum + * of 16 bytes must be allocated. + * 2) Zero, in which case data points to J0. In this case + * 16 bytes of J0 should be passed where J0 is defined + * by NIST SP800-38D. * */ } iv; /**< Initialisation vector parameters */ + + uint16_t digest_length; + /**< Length of the digest to be returned. If the verify option is set, + * this specifies the length of the digest to be compared for the + * session. + * + * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that the + * digest length is compliant with the hash algorithm being used. + * If the value is less than the maximum length allowed by the hash, + * the result shall be truncated. + */ }; @@ -437,8 +374,8 @@ struct rte_crypto_aead_xform { /**< AEAD algorithm selection */ struct { - uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */ - size_t length; /**< key length in bytes */ + const uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */ + uint16_t length; /**< key length in bytes */ } key; struct { @@ -447,11 +384,6 @@ struct rte_crypto_aead_xform { * specified as number of bytes from start of crypto * operation (rte_crypto_op). * - * - For GCM mode, this is either the IV (if the length - * is 96 bits) or J0 (for other sizes), where J0 is as - * defined by NIST SP800-38D. Regardless of the IV - * length, a full 16 bytes needs to be allocated. - * * - For CCM mode, the first byte is reserved, and the * nonce should be written starting at &iv[1] (to allow * space for the implementation to write in the flags @@ -465,18 +397,27 @@ struct rte_crypto_aead_xform { uint16_t length; /**< Length of valid IV data. * - * - For GCM mode, this is either 12 (for 96-bit IVs) - * or 16, in which case data points to J0. + * - For GCM mode, this is either: + * 1) Number greater or equal to one, which means that IV + * is used and J0 will be computed internally, a minimum + * of 16 bytes must be allocated. + * 2) Zero, in which case data points to J0. In this case + * 16 bytes of J0 should be passed where J0 is defined + * by NIST SP800-38D. * * - For CCM mode, this is the length of the nonce, * which can be in the range 7 to 13 inclusive. */ } iv; /**< Initialisation vector parameters */ - uint32_t digest_length; + uint16_t digest_length; - uint16_t add_auth_data_length; - /**< The length of the additional authenticated data (AAD) in bytes. */ + uint16_t aad_length; + /**< The length of the additional authenticated data (AAD) in bytes. + * For CCM mode, this is the length of the actual AAD, even though + * it is required to reserve 18 bytes before the AAD and padding + * at the end of it, so a multiple of 16 bytes is allocated. + */ }; /** Crypto transformation types */ @@ -554,8 +495,11 @@ struct rte_crypto_sym_op { /**< Handle for the initialised session context */ struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *xform; /**< Session-less API crypto operation parameters */ + struct rte_security_session *sec_session; + /**< Handle for the initialised security session context */ }; + RTE_STD_C11 union { struct { struct { @@ -591,7 +535,7 @@ struct rte_crypto_sym_op { * For GCM (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM), for * "digest result" read "authentication tag T". */ - phys_addr_t phys_addr; + rte_iova_t phys_addr; /**< Physical address of digest */ } digest; /**< Digest parameters */ struct { @@ -603,20 +547,19 @@ struct rte_crypto_sym_op { * Specifically for CCM (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_CCM), * the caller should setup this field as follows: * - * - the nonce should be written starting at an offset - * of one byte into the array, leaving room for the - * implementation to write in the flags to the first - * byte. - * - * - the additional authentication data itself should + * - the additional authentication data itself should * be written starting at an offset of 18 bytes into - * the array, leaving room for the length encoding in - * the first two bytes of the second block. + * the array, leaving room for the first block (16 bytes) + * and the length encoding in the first two bytes of the + * second block. * * - the array should be big enough to hold the above - * fields, plus any padding to round this up to the - * nearest multiple of the block size (16 bytes). - * Padding will be added by the implementation. + * fields, plus any padding to round this up to the + * nearest multiple of the block size (16 bytes). + * Padding will be added by the implementation. + * + * - Note that PMDs may modify the memory reserved + * (first 18 bytes and the final padding). * * Finally, for GCM (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM), the * caller should setup this field as follows: @@ -627,7 +570,7 @@ struct rte_crypto_sym_op { * of the block size (16 bytes). * */ - phys_addr_t phys_addr; /**< physical address */ + rte_iova_t phys_addr; /**< physical address */ } aad; /**< Additional authentication parameters */ } aead; @@ -658,15 +601,6 @@ struct rte_crypto_sym_op { * also the same as the result length. * * @note - * In the case of CCM - * @ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_CCM, this value - * should not include the length of the padding - * or the length of the MAC; the driver will - * compute the actual number of bytes over - * which the encryption will occur, which will - * include these values. - * - * @note * For SNOW 3G @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SNOW3G_UEA2, * KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_KASUMI_F8 * and ZUC @ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_ZUC_EEA3, @@ -683,31 +617,31 @@ struct rte_crypto_sym_op { * packet in source buffer. * * @note - * For CCM and GCM modes of operation, - * this field is ignored. - * The field @ref aad field should be set - * instead. - * - * @note * For SNOW 3G @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SNOW3G_UIA2, * KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_KASUMI_F9 * and ZUC @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_ZUC_EIA3, * this field should be in bits. + * + * @note + * For KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_KASUMI_F9, + * this offset should be such that + * data to authenticate starts at COUNT. */ uint32_t length; /**< The message length, in bytes, of the source * buffer that the hash will be computed on. * * @note - * For CCM and GCM modes of operation, - * this field is ignored. The field @ref aad - * field should be set instead. - * - * @note * For SNOW 3G @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SNOW3G_UIA2, * KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_KASUMI_F9 * and ZUC @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_ZUC_EIA3, * this field should be in bits. + * + * @note + * For KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_KASUMI_F9, + * the length should include the COUNT, + * FRESH, message, direction bit and padding + * (to be multiple of 8 bits). */ } data; /**< Data offsets and length for authentication */ @@ -733,62 +667,53 @@ struct rte_crypto_sym_op { * will overwrite any data at this location. * * @note - * For GCM (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GCM), for - * "digest result" read "authentication tag T". - */ - phys_addr_t phys_addr; - /**< Physical address of digest */ - } digest; /**< Digest parameters */ - - struct { - uint8_t *data; - /**< Pointer to Additional Authenticated - * Data (AAD) needed for authenticated cipher - * mechanisms (CCM and GCM). - * - * The length of the data pointed to by this - * field is set up for the session in the @ref - * rte_crypto_auth_xform structure as part of - * the @ref rte_cryptodev_sym_session_create - * function call. - * This length must not exceed 65535 (2^16-1) - * bytes. - * - * Specifically for CCM - * (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_CCM), - * the caller should setup this field as follows: - * - * - the nonce should be written starting at - * an offset of one byte into the array, - * leaving room for the implementation to - * write in the flags to the first byte. - * - * - the additional authentication data - * itself should be written starting at - * an offset of 18 bytes into the array, - * leaving room for the length encoding in - * the first two bytes of the second block. + * Digest-encrypted case. + * Digest can be generated, appended to + * the end of raw data and encrypted + * together using chained digest + * generation + * (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE) + * and encryption + * (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_ENCRYPT) + * xforms. Similarly, authentication + * of the raw data against appended, + * decrypted digest, can be performed + * using decryption + * (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_DECRYPT) + * and digest verification + * (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY) + * chained xforms. + * To perform those operations, a few + * additional conditions must be met: + * - caller must allocate at least + * digest_length of memory at the end of + * source and (in case of out-of-place + * operations) destination buffer; those + * buffers can be linear or split using + * scatter-gather lists, + * - digest data pointer must point to + * the end of source or (in case of + * out-of-place operations) destination + * data, which is pointer to the + * data buffer + auth.data.offset + + * auth.data.length, + * - cipher.data.offset + + * cipher.data.length must be greater + * than auth.data.offset + + * auth.data.length and is typically + * equal to auth.data.offset + + * auth.data.length + digest_length. * - * - the array should be big enough to hold - * the above fields, plus any padding to - * round this up to the nearest multiple of - * the block size (16 bytes). - * Padding will be added by the implementation. - * - * Finally, for GCM - * (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GCM), the - * caller should setup this field as follows: - * - * - the AAD is written in starting at byte 0 - * - the array must be big enough to hold - * the AAD, plus any space to round this up to - * the nearest multiple of the block size - * (16 bytes). + * Note, that for security reasons, it + * is PMDs' responsibility to not + * leave an unencrypted digest in any + * buffer after performing auth-cipher + * operations. * */ - phys_addr_t phys_addr; /**< physical address */ - } aad; - /**< Additional authentication parameters */ + rte_iova_t phys_addr; + /**< Physical address of digest */ + } digest; /**< Digest parameters */ } auth; }; };