From: Rasesh Mody <rasesh.mody@cavium.com>
Date: Sat, 7 Oct 2017 06:31:10 +0000 (-0700)
Subject: net/qede/base: fix for VF malicious indication
X-Git-Tag: spdx-start~1542
X-Git-Url: http://git.droids-corp.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=eb35c732fe7c82dbf4b1115030e75a7d212350b8;p=dpdk.git

net/qede/base: fix for VF malicious indication

IOV regression testing led to discovery of a minor issue + possibly race
in IOV flows:
 a. Malicious indications in VF-database on PF-side get cleared during
    FLR flows - but not when disabling SRIOV. At least in Linux if you
    disable IOV while having a malicious VF you wouldn't be able to
    clear the indication as driver would prevent from initializing it.
 b. Possible race during PF response to VF - the channel is made ready
    only after sending the rc via dmae to VF. It's possible due to
    context switch at end of DMAE [when releasing Mutex] that VF would
    start running and send another message prior to PF clearing the
    channel, making the FW consider that VF to be malicious.

This patch fixes that by
 - clearing the indication even if we're only going to disable VF
 - resetting the channel to ready before PF copies the rc to the VF, PF
   can then continue and send an additional message

Fixes: 47b302d64624 ("net/qede/base: add handling of malicious VF")
Fixes: 86a2265e59d7 ("qede: add SRIOV support")
Cc: stable@dpdk.org

Signed-off-by: Rasesh Mody <rasesh.mody@cavium.com>
---

diff --git a/drivers/net/qede/base/ecore_sriov.c b/drivers/net/qede/base/ecore_sriov.c
index b85718fb6a..18458cf7c3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/qede/base/ecore_sriov.c
+++ b/drivers/net/qede/base/ecore_sriov.c
@@ -865,6 +865,11 @@ ecore_iov_enable_vf_access(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn,
 	u32 igu_vf_conf = IGU_VF_CONF_FUNC_EN;
 	enum _ecore_status_t rc = ECORE_SUCCESS;
 
+	/* It's possible VF was previously considered malicious -
+	 * clear the indication even if we're only going to disable VF.
+	 */
+	vf->b_malicious = false;
+
 	if (vf->to_disable)
 		return ECORE_SUCCESS;
 
@@ -877,8 +882,6 @@ ecore_iov_enable_vf_access(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn,
 
 	ecore_iov_vf_igu_reset(p_hwfn, p_ptt, vf);
 
-	/* It's possible VF was previously considered malicious */
-	vf->b_malicious = false;
 	rc = ecore_iov_enable_vf_access_msix(p_hwfn, p_ptt,
 					     vf->abs_vf_id, vf->num_sbs);
 	if (rc != ECORE_SUCCESS)
@@ -1397,14 +1400,18 @@ static void ecore_iov_send_response(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn,
 			     (sizeof(union pfvf_tlvs) - sizeof(u64)) / 4,
 			     &params);
 
-	ecore_dmae_host2host(p_hwfn, p_ptt, mbx->reply_phys,
-			     mbx->req_virt->first_tlv.reply_address,
-			     sizeof(u64) / 4, &params);
-
+	/* Once PF copies the rc to the VF, the latter can continue and
+	 * and send an additional message. So we have to make sure the
+	 * channel would be re-set to ready prior to that.
+	 */
 	REG_WR(p_hwfn,
 	       GTT_BAR0_MAP_REG_USDM_RAM +
 	       USTORM_VF_PF_CHANNEL_READY_OFFSET(eng_vf_id), 1);
 
+	ecore_dmae_host2host(p_hwfn, p_ptt, mbx->reply_phys,
+			     mbx->req_virt->first_tlv.reply_address,
+			     sizeof(u64) / 4, &params);
+
 	OSAL_IOV_PF_RESP_TYPE(p_hwfn, p_vf->relative_vf_id, status);
 }