}
bool ecore_iov_is_valid_vfid(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn, int rel_vf_id,
- bool b_enabled_only)
+ bool b_enabled_only, bool b_non_malicious)
{
if (!p_hwfn->pf_iov_info) {
DP_NOTICE(p_hwfn->p_dev, true, "No iov info\n");
b_enabled_only)
return false;
+ if ((p_hwfn->pf_iov_info->vfs_array[rel_vf_id].b_malicious) &&
+ b_non_malicious)
+ return false;
+
return true;
}
return OSAL_NULL;
}
- if (ecore_iov_is_valid_vfid(p_hwfn, relative_vf_id, b_enabled_only))
+ if (ecore_iov_is_valid_vfid(p_hwfn, relative_vf_id,
+ b_enabled_only, false))
vf = &p_hwfn->pf_iov_info->vfs_array[relative_vf_id];
else
DP_ERR(p_hwfn, "ecore_iov_get_vf_info: VF[%d] is not enabled\n",
return ECORE_SUCCESS;
}
-bool ecore_iov_pf_sanity_check(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn, int vfid)
+bool _ecore_iov_pf_sanity_check(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn, int vfid,
+ bool b_fail_malicious)
{
/* Check PF supports sriov */
if (IS_VF(p_hwfn->p_dev) || !IS_ECORE_SRIOV(p_hwfn->p_dev) ||
return false;
/* Check VF validity */
- if (!ecore_iov_is_valid_vfid(p_hwfn, vfid, true))
+ if (!ecore_iov_is_valid_vfid(p_hwfn, vfid, true, b_fail_malicious))
return false;
return true;
}
+bool ecore_iov_pf_sanity_check(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn, int vfid)
+{
+ return _ecore_iov_pf_sanity_check(p_hwfn, vfid, true);
+}
+
void ecore_iov_set_vf_to_disable(struct ecore_dev *p_dev,
u16 rel_vf_id, u8 to_disable)
{
ecore_iov_vf_igu_reset(p_hwfn, p_ptt, vf);
+ /* It's possible VF was previously considered malicious */
+ vf->b_malicious = false;
+
rc = ecore_mcp_config_vf_msix(p_hwfn, p_ptt,
vf->abs_vf_id, vf->num_sbs);
if (rc != ECORE_SUCCESS)
pfdev_info->major_fp_hsi = ETH_HSI_VER_MAJOR;
pfdev_info->minor_fp_hsi = ETH_HSI_VER_MINOR;
+ /* TODO - not doing anything is bad since we'll assert, but this isn't
+ * necessarily the right behavior - perhaps we should have allowed some
+ * versatility here.
+ */
+ if (vf->state != VF_FREE &&
+ vf->state != VF_STOPPED) {
+ DP_VERBOSE(p_hwfn, ECORE_MSG_IOV,
+ "VF[%d] sent ACQUIRE but is already in state %d - fail request\n",
+ vf->abs_vf_id, vf->state);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/* Validate FW compatibility */
if (req->vfdev_info.eth_fp_hsi_major != ETH_HSI_VER_MAJOR) {
if (req->vfdev_info.capabilities &
return rc;
}
-static int ecore_iov_configure_vport_forced(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn,
- struct ecore_vf_info *p_vf,
- u64 events)
+static enum _ecore_status_t
+ecore_iov_configure_vport_forced(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn,
+ struct ecore_vf_info *p_vf,
+ u64 events)
{
enum _ecore_status_t rc = ECORE_SUCCESS;
struct ecore_filter_ucast filter;
pq_params.eth.is_vf = 1;
pq_params.eth.vf_id = vf->relative_vf_id;
- req = &mbx->req_virt->start_txq;
OSAL_MEMSET(&p_params, 0, sizeof(p_params));
+ req = &mbx->req_virt->start_txq;
+
+ if (!ecore_iov_validate_txq(p_hwfn, vf, req->tx_qid) ||
+ !ecore_iov_validate_sb(p_hwfn, vf, req->hw_sb))
+ goto out;
+
p_params.queue_id = (u8)vf->vf_queues[req->tx_qid].fw_tx_qid;
+ p_params.qzone_id = (u8)vf->vf_queues[req->tx_qid].fw_tx_qid;
p_params.vport_id = vf->vport_id;
p_params.stats_id = vf->abs_vf_id + 0x10,
p_params.sb = req->hw_sb;
p_params.sb_idx = req->sb_index;
- if (!ecore_iov_validate_txq(p_hwfn, vf, req->tx_qid) ||
- !ecore_iov_validate_sb(p_hwfn, vf, req->hw_sb))
- goto out;
-
- rc = ecore_sp_eth_txq_start_ramrod(
- p_hwfn,
- vf->opaque_fid,
- vf->vf_queues[req->tx_qid].fw_cid,
- &p_params,
- req->pbl_addr,
- req->pbl_size,
- &pq_params);
+ rc = ecore_sp_eth_txq_start_ramrod(p_hwfn,
+ vf->opaque_fid,
+ vf->vf_queues[req->tx_qid].fw_cid,
+ &p_params,
+ req->pbl_addr,
+ req->pbl_size,
+ &pq_params);
if (rc)
status = PFVF_STATUS_FAILURE;
return rc;
}
-int ecore_iov_mark_vf_flr(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn, u32 *p_disabled_vfs)
+bool ecore_iov_mark_vf_flr(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn, u32 *p_disabled_vfs)
{
- u16 i, found = 0;
+ bool found;
+ u16 i;
DP_VERBOSE(p_hwfn, ECORE_MSG_IOV, "Marking FLR-ed VFs\n");
for (i = 0; i < (VF_MAX_STATIC / 32); i++)
if (!p_hwfn->p_dev->p_iov_info) {
DP_NOTICE(p_hwfn, true, "VF flr but no IOV\n");
- return 0;
+ return false;
}
/* Mark VFs */
* VF flr until ACKs, we're safe.
*/
p_flr[rel_vf_id / 64] |= 1ULL << (rel_vf_id % 64);
- found = 1;
+ found = true;
}
}
p_vf, mbx->first_tlv.tl.type);
/* check if tlv type is known */
- if (ecore_iov_tlv_supported(mbx->first_tlv.tl.type)) {
+ if (ecore_iov_tlv_supported(mbx->first_tlv.tl.type) &&
+ !p_vf->b_malicious) {
/* switch on the opcode */
switch (mbx->first_tlv.tl.type) {
case CHANNEL_TLV_ACQUIRE:
ecore_iov_vf_mbx_release(p_hwfn, p_ptt, p_vf);
break;
}
+ } else if (ecore_iov_tlv_supported(mbx->first_tlv.tl.type)) {
+ /* If we've received a message from a VF we consider malicious
+ * we ignore the messasge unless it's one for RELEASE, in which
+ * case we'll let it have the benefit of doubt, allowing the
+ * next loaded driver to start again.
+ */
+ if (mbx->first_tlv.tl.type == CHANNEL_TLV_RELEASE) {
+ /* TODO - initiate FLR, remove malicious indication */
+ DP_VERBOSE(p_hwfn, ECORE_MSG_IOV,
+ "VF [%02x] - considered malicious, but wanted to RELEASE. TODO\n",
+ p_vf->abs_vf_id);
+ } else {
+ DP_VERBOSE(p_hwfn, ECORE_MSG_IOV,
+ "VF [%02x] - considered malicious; Ignoring TLV [%04x]\n",
+ p_vf->abs_vf_id, mbx->first_tlv.tl.type);
+ }
+
+ ecore_iov_prepare_resp(p_hwfn, p_ptt, p_vf,
+ mbx->first_tlv.tl.type,
+ sizeof(struct pfvf_def_resp_tlv),
+ PFVF_STATUS_MALICIOUS);
} else {
/* unknown TLV - this may belong to a VF driver from the future
* - a version written after this PF driver was written, which
sizeof(u64) * ECORE_VF_ARRAY_LENGTH);
}
-static enum _ecore_status_t ecore_sriov_vfpf_msg(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn,
- u16 abs_vfid,
- struct regpair *vf_msg)
+static struct ecore_vf_info *
+ecore_sriov_get_vf_from_absid(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn, u16 abs_vfid)
{
u8 min = (u8)p_hwfn->p_dev->p_iov_info->first_vf_in_pf;
- struct ecore_vf_info *p_vf;
- if (!ecore_iov_pf_sanity_check(p_hwfn, (int)abs_vfid - min)) {
+ if (!_ecore_iov_pf_sanity_check(p_hwfn, (int)abs_vfid - min, false)) {
DP_VERBOSE(p_hwfn, ECORE_MSG_IOV,
- "Got a message from VF [abs 0x%08x] that cannot be"
+ "Got indication for VF [abs 0x%08x] that cannot be"
" handled by PF\n",
abs_vfid);
- return ECORE_SUCCESS;
+ return OSAL_NULL;
}
- p_vf = &p_hwfn->pf_iov_info->vfs_array[(u8)abs_vfid - min];
+
+ return &p_hwfn->pf_iov_info->vfs_array[(u8)abs_vfid - min];
+}
+
+static enum _ecore_status_t ecore_sriov_vfpf_msg(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn,
+ u16 abs_vfid,
+ struct regpair *vf_msg)
+{
+ struct ecore_vf_info *p_vf = ecore_sriov_get_vf_from_absid(p_hwfn,
+ abs_vfid);
+
+ if (!p_vf)
+ return ECORE_SUCCESS;
/* List the physical address of the request so that handler
* could later on copy the message from it.
return OSAL_PF_VF_MSG(p_hwfn, p_vf->relative_vf_id);
}
+static void ecore_sriov_vfpf_malicious(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn,
+ struct malicious_vf_eqe_data *p_data)
+{
+ struct ecore_vf_info *p_vf;
+
+ p_vf = ecore_sriov_get_vf_from_absid(p_hwfn, p_data->vfId);
+
+ if (!p_vf)
+ return;
+
+ DP_INFO(p_hwfn,
+ "VF [%d] - Malicious behavior [%02x]\n",
+ p_vf->abs_vf_id, p_data->errId);
+
+ p_vf->b_malicious = true;
+
+ OSAL_PF_VF_MALICIOUS(p_hwfn, p_vf->relative_vf_id);
+}
+
enum _ecore_status_t ecore_sriov_eqe_event(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn,
u8 opcode,
__le16 echo,
DP_VERBOSE(p_hwfn, ECORE_MSG_IOV,
"VF-FLR is still not supported\n");
return ECORE_SUCCESS;
+ case COMMON_EVENT_MALICIOUS_VF:
+ ecore_sriov_vfpf_malicious(p_hwfn, &data->malicious_vf);
+ return ECORE_SUCCESS;
default:
DP_INFO(p_hwfn->p_dev, "Unknown sriov eqe event 0x%02x\n",
opcode);
goto out;
for (i = rel_vf_id; i < p_iov->total_vfs; i++)
- if (ecore_iov_is_valid_vfid(p_hwfn, rel_vf_id, true))
+ if (ecore_iov_is_valid_vfid(p_hwfn, rel_vf_id, true, false))
return i;
out:
"Can not set forced MAC, invalid vfid [%d]\n", vfid);
return;
}
+ if (vf_info->b_malicious) {
+ DP_NOTICE(p_hwfn->p_dev, false,
+ "Can't set forced MAC to malicious VF [%d]\n",
+ vfid);
+ return;
+ }
feature = 1 << MAC_ADDR_FORCED;
OSAL_MEMCPY(vf_info->bulletin.p_virt->mac, mac, ETH_ALEN);
"Can not set MAC, invalid vfid [%d]\n", vfid);
return ECORE_INVAL;
}
+ if (vf_info->b_malicious) {
+ DP_NOTICE(p_hwfn->p_dev, false,
+ "Can't set MAC to malicious VF [%d]\n",
+ vfid);
+ return ECORE_INVAL;
+ }
if (vf_info->bulletin.p_virt->valid_bitmap & (1 << MAC_ADDR_FORCED)) {
DP_VERBOSE(p_hwfn, ECORE_MSG_IOV,
vf_info = ecore_iov_get_vf_info(p_hwfn, (u16)vfid, true);
if (!vf_info) {
DP_NOTICE(p_hwfn->p_dev, true,
- "Can not set forced MAC, invalid vfid [%d]\n", vfid);
+ "Can not set untagged default, invalid vfid [%d]\n",
+ vfid);
+ return ECORE_INVAL;
+ }
+ if (vf_info->b_malicious) {
+ DP_NOTICE(p_hwfn->p_dev, false,
+ "Can't set untagged default to malicious VF [%d]\n",
+ vfid);
return ECORE_INVAL;
}
vfid);
return;
}
+ if (vf_info->b_malicious) {
+ DP_NOTICE(p_hwfn->p_dev, false,
+ "Can't set forced vlan to malicious VF [%d]\n",
+ vfid);
+ return;
+ }
feature = 1 << VLAN_ADDR_FORCED;
vf_info->bulletin.p_virt->pvid = pvid;
return (p_vf->state == VF_ENABLED);
}
-int ecore_iov_get_vf_min_rate(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn, int vfid)
+enum _ecore_status_t
+ecore_iov_get_vf_min_rate(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn, int vfid)
{
struct ecore_wfq_data *vf_vp_wfq;
struct ecore_vf_info *vf_info;
git.droids-corp.org / dpdk.git / blobdiff