/**< Cipher algorithm */
struct {
- uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */
- uint16_t length;/**< key length in bytes */
+ const uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */
+ uint16_t length; /**< key length in bytes */
} key;
/**< Cipher key
*
*
* - For block ciphers in CTR mode, this is the counter.
*
- * - For GCM mode, this is either the IV (if the length
- * is 96 bits) or J0 (for other sizes), where J0 is as
- * defined by NIST SP800-38D. Regardless of the IV
- * length, a full 16 bytes needs to be allocated.
- *
* - For CCM mode, the first byte is reserved, and the
* nonce should be written starting at &iv[1] (to allow
* space for the implementation to write in the flags
* of the counter (which must be the same as the block
* length of the cipher).
*
- * - For GCM mode, this is either 12 (for 96-bit IVs)
- * or 16, in which case data points to J0.
- *
* - For CCM mode, this is the length of the nonce,
* which can be in the range 7 to 13 inclusive.
*/
/**< Authentication algorithm selection */
struct {
- uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */
- uint16_t length;/**< key length in bytes */
+ const uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */
+ uint16_t length; /**< key length in bytes */
} key;
/**< Authentication key data.
* The authentication key length MUST be less than or equal to the
* specified as number of bytes from start of crypto
* operation (rte_crypto_op).
*
- * - For SNOW 3G in UIA2 mode, for ZUC in EIA3 mode and
- * for AES-GMAC, this is the authentication
- * Initialisation Vector (IV) value.
+ * - For SNOW 3G in UIA2 mode, for ZUC in EIA3 mode
+ * this is the authentication Initialisation Vector
+ * (IV) value. For AES-GMAC IV description please refer
+ * to the field `length` in iv struct.
*
* - For KASUMI in F9 mode and other authentication
* algorithms, this field is not used.
* - For KASUMI in F9 mode and other authentication
* algorithms, this field is not used.
*
+ * - For GMAC mode, this is either:
+ * 1) Number greater or equal to one, which means that IV
+ * is used and J0 will be computed internally, a minimum
+ * of 16 bytes must be allocated.
+ * 2) Zero, in which case data points to J0. In this case
+ * 16 bytes of J0 should be passed where J0 is defined
+ * by NIST SP800-38D.
+ *
*/
} iv; /**< Initialisation vector parameters */
/**< AEAD algorithm selection */
struct {
- uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */
- uint16_t length;/**< key length in bytes */
+ const uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */
+ uint16_t length; /**< key length in bytes */
} key;
struct {
* specified as number of bytes from start of crypto
* operation (rte_crypto_op).
*
- * - For GCM mode, this is either the IV (if the length
- * is 96 bits) or J0 (for other sizes), where J0 is as
- * defined by NIST SP800-38D. Regardless of the IV
- * length, a full 16 bytes needs to be allocated.
- *
* - For CCM mode, the first byte is reserved, and the
* nonce should be written starting at &iv[1] (to allow
* space for the implementation to write in the flags
uint16_t length;
/**< Length of valid IV data.
*
- * - For GCM mode, this is either 12 (for 96-bit IVs)
- * or 16, in which case data points to J0.
+ * - For GCM mode, this is either:
+ * 1) Number greater or equal to one, which means that IV
+ * is used and J0 will be computed internally, a minimum
+ * of 16 bytes must be allocated.
+ * 2) Zero, in which case data points to J0. In this case
+ * 16 bytes of J0 should be passed where J0 is defined
+ * by NIST SP800-38D.
*
* - For CCM mode, this is the length of the nonce,
* which can be in the range 7 to 13 inclusive.
* For digest generation, the digest result
* will overwrite any data at this location.
*
+ * @note
+ * Digest-encrypted case.
+ * Digest can be generated, appended to
+ * the end of raw data and encrypted
+ * together using chained digest
+ * generation
+ * (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE)
+ * and encryption
+ * (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_ENCRYPT)
+ * xforms. Similarly, authentication
+ * of the raw data against appended,
+ * decrypted digest, can be performed
+ * using decryption
+ * (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_DECRYPT)
+ * and digest verification
+ * (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY)
+ * chained xforms.
+ * To perform those operations, a few
+ * additional conditions must be met:
+ * - caller must allocate at least
+ * digest_length of memory at the end of
+ * source and (in case of out-of-place
+ * operations) destination buffer; those
+ * buffers can be linear or split using
+ * scatter-gather lists,
+ * - digest data pointer must point to
+ * the end of source or (in case of
+ * out-of-place operations) destination
+ * data, which is pointer to the
+ * data buffer + auth.data.offset +
+ * auth.data.length,
+ * - cipher.data.offset +
+ * cipher.data.length must be greater
+ * than auth.data.offset +
+ * auth.data.length and is typically
+ * equal to auth.data.offset +
+ * auth.data.length + digest_length.
+ *
+ * Note, that for security reasons, it
+ * is PMDs' responsibility to not
+ * leave an unencrypted digest in any
+ * buffer after performing auth-cipher
+ * operations.
+ *
*/
rte_iova_t phys_addr;
/**< Physical address of digest */
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