net/qede/base: use trust mode for forced MAC limitations

When trust mode is set to ON, VF can change it's MAC address
inspite PF has set a forced MAC for that VF from HV.

Earlier similar functionality is provided by module parameter
"allow_vf_mac_change_mode" of qed.

This change makes few changes in behavior of VF shadow config -
 - Let driver track the VF mac in shadow config as long as trust
  mode is OFF.
 - Once trust mode is ON, we should not care about MACs in shadow
  config (because we never intend to fall back because of lack of restore
  implementation).
 - Delete existing shadow MAC (this helps when trust mode is turned OFF,
  and VF tries to add new MAC – it won’t fail that time since we have
  a clean slate).
 - Skip addition and deletion of MACs in shadow configs.

Signed-off-by: Shahed Shaikh <shahed.shaikh@cavium.com>

diff --git a/drivers/net/qede/base/ecore_iov_api.h b/drivers/net/qede/base/ecore_iov_api.h
index 29001d7..d398478 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/net/qede/base/ecore_iov_api.h
+++ b/drivers/net/qede/base/ecore_iov_api.h
@@ -84,6 +84,13 @@ struct ecore_public_vf_info {
         */
        u8 forced_mac[ETH_ALEN];
        u16 forced_vlan;
+
+       /* Trusted VFs can configure promiscuous mode and
+        * set MAC address inspite PF has set forced MAC.
+        * Also store shadow promisc configuration if needed.
+        */
+       bool is_trusted_configured;
+       bool is_trusted_request;
 };
 
 struct ecore_iov_vf_init_params {

diff --git a/drivers/net/qede/base/ecore_sriov.c b/drivers/net/qede/base/ecore_sriov.c
index f7ebf7a..9e4a57b 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/net/qede/base/ecore_sriov.c
+++ b/drivers/net/qede/base/ecore_sriov.c
@@ -1968,7 +1968,8 @@ ecore_iov_configure_vport_forced(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn,
                return ECORE_INVAL;
 
        if ((events & (1 << MAC_ADDR_FORCED)) ||
-           p_hwfn->pf_params.eth_pf_params.allow_vf_mac_change) {
+           p_hwfn->pf_params.eth_pf_params.allow_vf_mac_change ||
+           p_vf->p_vf_info.is_trusted_configured) {
                /* Since there's no way [currently] of removing the MAC,
                 * we can always assume this means we need to force it.
                 */
@@ -1989,7 +1990,8 @@ ecore_iov_configure_vport_forced(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn,
                        return rc;
                }
 
-               if (p_hwfn->pf_params.eth_pf_params.allow_vf_mac_change)
+               if (p_hwfn->pf_params.eth_pf_params.allow_vf_mac_change ||
+                   p_vf->p_vf_info.is_trusted_configured)
                        p_vf->configured_features |=
                                1 << VFPF_BULLETIN_MAC_ADDR;
                else
@@ -3351,6 +3353,15 @@ ecore_iov_vf_update_mac_shadow(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn,
        if (p_vf->bulletin.p_virt->valid_bitmap & (1 << MAC_ADDR_FORCED))
                return ECORE_SUCCESS;
 
+       /* Since we don't have the implementation of the logic for removing
+        * a forced MAC and restoring shadow MAC, let's not worry about
+        * processing shadow copies of MAC as long as VF trust mode is ON,
+        * to keep things simple.
+        */
+       if (p_hwfn->pf_params.eth_pf_params.allow_vf_mac_change ||
+           p_vf->p_vf_info.is_trusted_configured)
+               return ECORE_SUCCESS;
+
        /* First remove entries and then add new ones */
        if (p_params->opcode == ECORE_FILTER_REMOVE) {
                for (i = 0; i < ECORE_ETH_VF_NUM_MAC_FILTERS; i++) {
@@ -4415,17 +4426,23 @@ void ecore_iov_bulletin_set_forced_mac(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn,
                return;
        }
 
-       if (p_hwfn->pf_params.eth_pf_params.allow_vf_mac_change)
+       if (p_hwfn->pf_params.eth_pf_params.allow_vf_mac_change ||
+           vf_info->p_vf_info.is_trusted_configured) {
                feature = 1 << VFPF_BULLETIN_MAC_ADDR;
-       else
+               /* Trust mode will disable Forced MAC */
+               vf_info->bulletin.p_virt->valid_bitmap &=
+                       ~(1 << MAC_ADDR_FORCED);
+       } else {
                feature = 1 << MAC_ADDR_FORCED;
+               /* Forced MAC will disable MAC_ADDR */
+               vf_info->bulletin.p_virt->valid_bitmap &=
+                       ~(1 << VFPF_BULLETIN_MAC_ADDR);
+       }
 
-       OSAL_MEMCPY(vf_info->bulletin.p_virt->mac, mac, ETH_ALEN);
+       OSAL_MEMCPY(vf_info->bulletin.p_virt->mac,
+                   mac, ETH_ALEN);
 
        vf_info->bulletin.p_virt->valid_bitmap |= feature;
-       /* Forced MAC will disable MAC_ADDR */
-       vf_info->bulletin.p_virt->valid_bitmap &=
-           ~(1 << VFPF_BULLETIN_MAC_ADDR);
 
        ecore_iov_configure_vport_forced(p_hwfn, vf_info, feature);
 }
@@ -4460,7 +4477,8 @@ enum _ecore_status_t ecore_iov_bulletin_set_mac(struct ecore_hwfn *p_hwfn,
 
        vf_info->bulletin.p_virt->valid_bitmap |= feature;
 
-       if (p_hwfn->pf_params.eth_pf_params.allow_vf_mac_change)
+       if (p_hwfn->pf_params.eth_pf_params.allow_vf_mac_change ||
+           vf_info->p_vf_info.is_trusted_configured)
                ecore_iov_configure_vport_forced(p_hwfn, vf_info, feature);
 
        return ECORE_SUCCESS;