]> git.droids-corp.org - dpdk.git/commitdiff
crypto/aesni_gcm: do not append digest
authorPablo de Lara <pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com>
Tue, 5 Sep 2017 02:20:00 +0000 (03:20 +0100)
committerPablo de Lara <pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com>
Thu, 12 Oct 2017 14:10:51 +0000 (15:10 +0100)
When performing an authentication verification,
the PMD was using memory at the end of the input buffer,
to store temporarily the digest.
This operation requires the buffer to have enough
tailroom unnecessarily.
Instead, memory is allocated for each queue pair, to store
temporarily the digest generated by the driver, so it can
be compared with the one provided in the crypto operation,
without needing to touch the input buffer.

Signed-off-by: Pablo de Lara <pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com>
Acked-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd.c
drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_private.h

index 483ed87e33dd42f114c826214fbe2173c42691a6..29c14e5a28e153db8b6eadfe94b1933e2aae1e89 100644 (file)
@@ -298,14 +298,7 @@ process_gcm_crypto_op(struct aesni_gcm_qp *qp, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
                                sym_op->aead.digest.data,
                                (uint64_t)session->digest_length);
        } else if (session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION) {
-               uint8_t *auth_tag = (uint8_t *)rte_pktmbuf_append(sym_op->m_dst ?
-                               sym_op->m_dst : sym_op->m_src,
-                               session->digest_length);
-
-               if (!auth_tag) {
-                       GCM_LOG_ERR("auth_tag");
-                       return -1;
-               }
+               uint8_t *auth_tag = qp->temp_digest;
 
                qp->ops[session->key].init(&session->gdata_key,
                                &qp->gdata_ctx,
@@ -350,14 +343,7 @@ process_gcm_crypto_op(struct aesni_gcm_qp *qp, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
                                sym_op->auth.digest.data,
                                (uint64_t)session->digest_length);
        } else { /* AESNI_GMAC_OP_VERIFY */
-               uint8_t *auth_tag = (uint8_t *)rte_pktmbuf_append(sym_op->m_dst ?
-                               sym_op->m_dst : sym_op->m_src,
-                               session->digest_length);
-
-               if (!auth_tag) {
-                       GCM_LOG_ERR("auth_tag");
-                       return -1;
-               }
+               uint8_t *auth_tag = qp->temp_digest;
 
                qp->ops[session->key].init(&session->gdata_key,
                                &qp->gdata_ctx,
@@ -385,11 +371,10 @@ process_gcm_crypto_op(struct aesni_gcm_qp *qp, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
  * - Returns NULL on invalid job
  */
 static void
-post_process_gcm_crypto_op(struct rte_crypto_op *op,
+post_process_gcm_crypto_op(struct aesni_gcm_qp *qp,
+               struct rte_crypto_op *op,
                struct aesni_gcm_session *session)
 {
-       struct rte_mbuf *m = op->sym->m_dst ? op->sym->m_dst : op->sym->m_src;
-
        op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS;
 
        /* Verify digest if required */
@@ -397,8 +382,7 @@ post_process_gcm_crypto_op(struct rte_crypto_op *op,
                        session->op == AESNI_GMAC_OP_VERIFY) {
                uint8_t *digest;
 
-               uint8_t *tag = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(m, uint8_t *,
-                               m->data_len - session->digest_length);
+               uint8_t *tag = (uint8_t *)&qp->temp_digest;
 
                if (session->op == AESNI_GMAC_OP_VERIFY)
                        digest = op->sym->auth.digest.data;
@@ -414,9 +398,6 @@ post_process_gcm_crypto_op(struct rte_crypto_op *op,
 
                if (memcmp(tag, digest, session->digest_length) != 0)
                        op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-
-               /* trim area used for digest from mbuf */
-               rte_pktmbuf_trim(m, session->digest_length);
        }
 }
 
@@ -435,7 +416,7 @@ handle_completed_gcm_crypto_op(struct aesni_gcm_qp *qp,
                struct rte_crypto_op *op,
                struct aesni_gcm_session *sess)
 {
-       post_process_gcm_crypto_op(op, sess);
+       post_process_gcm_crypto_op(qp, op, sess);
 
        /* Free session if a session-less crypto op */
        if (op->sess_type == RTE_CRYPTO_OP_SESSIONLESS) {
index 7e155729b4ce2148268413476693a8a762f214d5..1c8835b572861fd6ea61332ff0bfbb9cf1c07765 100644 (file)
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@
 #define GCM_LOG_DBG(fmt, args...)
 #endif
 
+/* Maximum length for digest */
+#define DIGEST_LENGTH_MAX 16
 
 /** private data structure for each virtual AESNI GCM device */
 struct aesni_gcm_private {
@@ -84,6 +86,11 @@ struct aesni_gcm_qp {
        /**< Queue Pair Identifier */
        char name[RTE_CRYPTODEV_NAME_LEN];
        /**< Unique Queue Pair Name */
+       uint8_t temp_digest[DIGEST_LENGTH_MAX];
+       /**< Buffer used to store the digest generated
+        * by the driver when verifying a digest provided
+        * by the user (using authentication verify operation)
+        */
 } __rte_cache_aligned;